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Control is one of the most important and commonly used concepts in corporate 
governance. Nonetheless, the definition of the concept has proved impossible to define 
with precision. This difficulty has not stopped researchers from investigating how to 
allocate control in firms. Since the extant work of Aghion and Bolton,1 the finance 
literature suggests that control should contingently be assigned to creditors in distressed 
firms as a way to limit agency costs. As a matter of fact, it is common to see in the 
financial literature the assumption that violation of debt covenants generates shifts in 
control.2 Some legal scholars in the United States have recently supported this view, both 
descriptively and normatively. Baird and Rasmussen,3 as well as Skeel,4 have argued that 
control shifts to creditors in distressed firms and that such shift is indeed beneficial from 
an efficiency standpoint. 
 
This position stands in stark contrast to the recent experience in the United 
Kingdom which led to the adoption of the Enterprise act of 2002. This act has, for the 
most part, abolished the administrative receivership, which had drawn concern due to the 
perceived lack of transparency and accountability.5 Armour and Mokal describe the 
                                                 
1 See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”, 59 
Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992). 
2 See Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts “How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt 
Covenants”, forthcoming Journal of Finance, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854324 (last visited 2/1/08), at 2 (“However, the instant 
that the borrower's net worth falls below this threshold, regardless of the amount, control rights shift to the 
creditor …” “…transfer of control rights accompanying a covenant violation leads to a significant decline 
in investment activity, as creditors intervene in order to thwart inefficient investment or punish managers 
for perceived misbehavior”). For an exception, see Gary Gorton & James Kahn “The Design of Bank Loan 
Contracts”, 13 Review of Financial Studies 331, 359 (2000) (“The firm sometimes has an incentive to 
increase volatility. The outside claimant that is in a position to prevent this, the bank, only imperfectly 
controls borrower risk-taking”) 
3 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002). 
4 See David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003). 
5 Unsecured creditors were viewed as the main constituency suffering from the administrative receivership 
consequences. See Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency – A Second Chance, Cm 5234, London, TSO 
(2001), 9.  
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administrative receivership as being “widely regarded as giving an unhealthy amount of 
power to creditors holding floating charges, who because of their secured status lacked 
sufficient incentives to rescue failing companies.”6  
 
In this paper, I consider the implications of allocating control to a lender. Drawing 
inferences from the literature on the theory of the firm, I uncover the existence of lender 
control costs beyond conflict of interests due to claimholders with priority differences. 
The priority differences’ cosmology stems from a view of the firm as composed by 
explicit contracts. Breaking away from that paradigm allows us to identify other sources 
of lender control costs not tied to priority differences between classes of claimholders. 
Specifically, I show that even when there is only one class of legal claimholders, lender 
control may generate suboptimal results due to the suboptimal investment incentives that 
parties not fully covered by explicit contracts may have.  
 
In addition, I argue that broadening the definition of the firm sheds light on the 
role of lender control and functionally related theories (i.e. equitable subordination) of 
liability. These theories had been criticized by academics and practitioners alike due to 
the dire consequences they pose on lending,7 while their role has been dwarfing. In 
particular, widening the definition of the theory of the firm allows us to visualize that 
lender control liability should serve to penalize self-serving behavior which runs counter 
to the optimal use of the assets.      
 
Finally, I discuss the strict nature of lender control liability and its relation to 
cognitive errors. The ordinary understanding is that lender control triggers harmful strict 
lender liability. Therefore, lender control liability should be heavily limited or even 
                                                 
6 See John Armour & Rizwaan J. Mokal “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise 
Act of 2002”, Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 29 (2005). This perception of 
inefficiency grew despite the existence of the so called ‘London Approach”, where secured creditors 
wouldn’t press for insolvency under the threat of losing future business. See John Armour & Simon Deakin 
“Norms in Private Insolvency Procedures: The ‘‘London Approach’’ to the Resolution of Financial 
Distress”, 1 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 21 (2001) 
7 See, for example, John C. Joyce “Lender Liability: The Problem Is still with Us”, 115 Banking L. J. 477, 
483 (1998); J. Dennis Hynes “Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor”, 58 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 635 (1991). 
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suppressed so that the efficient lending is not precluded. I argue that the strict nature of 
lender control liability may avoid inefficiencies deriving from hindsight bias, but that 
hindsight is not the only cognitive error distorting adjudicators. A closer look at 
anchoring’s role in damage assessments, permits to refocus policy recommendations and 
help explain the shortcomings of strict liability in this context.        
 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II, discusses the predominant as well as 
competing theories of the firm and their implications for lender control evaluations. Part 
III, presents a model to show lender control costs even when there’s only one class of 
legal claimants to the firm assets. Part IV, investigates rationales behind the dwarfing role 
of lender liability theories in the United States and argues that it is in part due to the 
misconception that freedom of contracts will always generate socially optimal results. 
Part V, shows that fears of adjudication errors due to hindsight bias in the context of 
lender control liability theories are somewhat misplaced and that policy oriented 
recommendations should focus not only on hindsight bias but also on anchoring. Part VI 
provides concluding remarks.   
 
II. The Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm 
Knowing what constitutes a firm is important, both for healthy and distressed 
firms, as a way to understand whether it is beneficial to have a firm and whether 
allocation of control influences efficiency.8 Originally, the firm was viewed in terms of 
the technological transformations a firm was capable of doing,9 focusing on the 
maximization of the production function of the firm.10 Milgrom and Roberts suggest that 
                                                 
8 In previous work, I have discussed extensively different theories of the firm and their implications for 
value and control. See Sergio A. Muro “Bankruptcy Control and the Theory of the Firm”, unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author. 
9 See Sidney G. Winter “On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 163, 164 (1988). For an early presentation of the neoclassical viewpoint, see Jacob Viner 
“Cost Curves and Supply Curves”, 3 Zeitschrift für National-ökonomie 23 (1932). Hart considers that “A 
manager presides over this production set, buying and selling inputs and outputs in a spot market and 
choosing the plan that maximizes owners' welfare.” See Oliver Hart “An Economist’s Perspective on the 
Theory of the Firm”, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1757, 1759 (1989). 
10 See Sidney G. Winter “On Coase, Competence, and the Corporation”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization 163, 164 (1988). Holmstrom and Tirole argue that the theory of the firm in neoclassical terms 
just asked “what forces ensure that the process will maximize profits”. See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean 
Tirole “The Theory of the Firm”, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 61, 63 (1989). 
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this “neoclassical theory” looked at market failures in competitive environments to find 
reasons for non-market organizations (i.e. market power, increasing returns to scale, 
externalities, coordination problems, etc).11  
 
Later advances replaced this conceptualization by what Zingales refers to as the 
“explicit nexus of contracts theory”,12 which is the prevalent view of the firm in 
corporate finance.13 It originated with Alchian and Demsetz’s14 study where input from 
different individuals cannot be verified while output can. As free riding would emerge, 
their solution involved allowing one person to monitor the venture, pay the other 
individuals fixed amounts and receive all the residual claims from the firm.15  Jensen and 
Meckling16 contributed greatly to this approach by describing the firm as a legal fiction 
tying a set of contractual relations together.17 As a result, the firm boundaries’ are set by 
the costs the monitor incurs in controlling that the agents perform according to the 
contracts.18
 
As all contracts are assumed to be explicit, the explicit nexus of contracts theory 
considers that each constituent, except for the shareholders, is fully paid its opportunity 
cost. Therefore, a firm cannot be worth more than the sum of contracts it unites19 and 
                                                 
11 See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT, Prentice 
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 73-7. 
12 See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1630 (2000). 
13 See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1630 (2000). 
14 See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz “Production, Information Costs and economic Organization”, 62 
American Economic Review 777 (1972). 
15 See Bengt R. Holmstrom & Jean Tirole “The Theory of the Firm”, 1 Handbook of Industrial 
Organization 61, 67 (1989). 
16 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure”, 4 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976). 
17 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976). 
18 Jensen and Meckling define an agency relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent.” See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling 
“Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial 
Economics 305, 308-11 (1976). Then agency costs are composed of “1. the monitoring expenditures by the 
principal, 2. the bonding expenditures by the agent, 3. the residual loss.” See Michael C. Jensen & William 
H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 
Journal of Financial Economics 305, 322-3 (1976). 
19 See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1631 (2000). In Jensen 
and Meckling words “The private corporation or firm is simply one form of legal fiction which serves as a 
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shareholders, as only residual claimants, need to be allocated the decision rights.20 In the 
same vein, only shareholder interests should be pursued by the firm. As a corollary 
consequence, in order to value the firm, computing only legal claims’ prices is relevant.21  
 
The explicit nexus of contracts theory is widespread through law academia and 
court opinions. For example, in the law literature, Easterbrook and Fischel, when they 
discuss voting, consider that “The right to vote is the right to make all the decisions not 
otherwise provided by contract – whether the contract is express or supplied by legal 
rules”,22 implying that residual powers need merely be with the only class possessing 
residual rights: the shareholders. As for judicial decisions, an example can be observed in 
the recent opinion Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P.,23 where 
the Chancery Court of Delaware while considering the existence of duties towards 
creditors in vicinity of insolvency expressed that “So long as directors are respectful of 
the corporation's obligation to honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to 
pursue in good faith profit for the corporation's equityholders”,24 implying that other 
constituents besides shareholders are paid their full opportunity cost. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
nexus for contracting relationships and which is also characterized by the existence of divisible residual 
claims on the assets and cash flows of the organization which can generally be sold without permission of 
the other contracting individuals. Although this definition of the firm has little substantive content, 
emphasizing the essential contractual nature of firms and other organizations focuses attention on a crucial 
set of questions—why particular sets of contractual relations arise for various types of organizations, what 
the consequences of these contractual relations are, and how they are affected by changes exogenous to the 
organization. Viewed this way, it makes little or no sense to try to distinguish those things that are “inside” 
the firm (or any other organization) from those things that are “outside” of it.” See Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, 
3 Journal of Financial Economics 305, 311 (1976). 
20 Esaterbrook and Fischel consider that “As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the 
appropriate incentives (collective choice problems to one side) to make discretionary decisions… Yet all of 
the actors, except the shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims on the income 
stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased security) from the undertaking of a new project. The 
shareholders receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal costs. They therefore have 
the right incentives to exercise discretion.” See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel “Voting in 
Corporate Law”, 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395, 403 (1983). 
21 See Michael C. Jensen “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective 
Function”, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 19 (2001) (“In sum, the appropriate measure for the 
organization is value creation, the change in the market value of all claims on the firm.”) 
22 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel “Voting in Corporate Law”, 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics 395, 402 (1983). 
23 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, Del. Ch. (2006) 
24 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174-5 Del. Ch. (2006)  
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The explicit nexus of contracts paradigm has generated a standard way of 
approaching control allocation in distressed firms. Following the works of Jensen and 
Meckling25 and Myers26 allocation of control is associated exclusively to conflict of 
interests between classes of individuals holding claims with different priority levels. 
Jensen and Meckling’s observed that if shareholders of an over-leveraged firm (i.e. debt 
over asset ratio over 1) are at the helm, they will have incentives to over-invest in high 
variance projects leaving them to enjoy potential benefits and the creditors to suffer 
potential losses. Myers’ uncovered the underinvestment problem. He described a firm’s 
investment opportunity as call options whose likelihood of being exercised depends on 
the conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders. As debtholders had a cap 
on maximum recovery, if they were at the helm they would disregard opportunities that 
made them suffer losses in bad scenarios without letting them enjoy the benefits in the 
good scenarios, regardless of the net present value of the project. Therefore, debtholders’ 
control over investment policy may lead to underinvestment. Empirical studies linking 
firm characteristics to financial policy decisions suggest the accuracy of those theories.27 
Aghion and Bolton extended this line of work to show that ex ante efficiency is advanced 
by allocating control contingent in the financial signals of the firm.28
 
Relying on theoretical implications of the explicit nexus of contracts theory, Baird 
and Rasmussen, as well as Skeel, have praised what they perceive as a new bankruptcy 
era where control shifts to creditors upon distress.29 Baird and Rasmussen consider that 
                                                 
25 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure”, 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305 (1976) 
26 See Stewart C. Myers “Determinants of Corporate Borrowings”, 5 Journal of Financial Economics 147 
(1977).
27 See, generally, Clifford W. Smith & Ross L. Watts “The Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate 
Financing, Dividend, and Compensation Policies”, 32 Journal of Financial Economics 263 (1992). 
28 See Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”, 
59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992).   
29 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate 
Governance”, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006); David A. Skeel, Jr. “The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-
in-Possession Financing”, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905, 1920-1 (2004). The idea of control transfers due to 
debt covenant violations is widely accepted in the finance literature. See, for example, Sudheer Chava & 
Michael R. Roberts “How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt Covenants”, forthcoming 
Journal of Finance, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854324 (last visited 
2/1/08), at 1 (“Upon breaching a covenant, control rights shift to the creditor who can use the threat of 
accelerating the loan to choose their most preferred course of action or to extract concessions from the 
borrower to choose the borrower's most preferred course of action”) 
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“Today’s investors allocate control rights among themselves through elaborate and 
sophisticated contracts that already anticipate financial distress. In the presence of these 
contracts, a law of corporate reorganizations is largely unnecessary.”30 Professor Skeel 
believes that the new “governance levers have dramatically improved the quality of 
chapter 11 governance.”31
 
Regardless of the appeal of its straightforward logic,32 several papers have 
discussed some shortcomings of the explicit nexus of contracts theory. Fama and Miller 
have pointed out that bondholders are not completely protected from shareholder decision 
making.33 Becker points to worker’s specialization to observe that those employees can 
be affected if the firm fires them before they recoup the investment in specialization and 
therefore are residual claimants also.34 In addition, Shleifer and Summers studied 
efficiency gains of takeovers to conclude that at least in part they arise out of wealth 
redistribution from stakeholders to shareholders (the redistribution of wealth may come 
from employees, government or suppliers).35 Therefore, even though shareholders are the 
                                                 
30 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 755 
(2002). In the same vein they mention “When control rights are allocated coherently, no legal intervention 
is needed to ensure that decisions about the firm’s future are made sensibly. Most large firms now allocate 
control rights among investors in a way that ensures coherent decisionmaking throughout the firm’s life 
cycle.” See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751, 778 
(2002). 
31 See David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 917, 920 (2003) 
32 In this regard, Jensen notes that “It is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at the 
same time unless the dimensions are what are known as “monotonic transformations” of one another. Thus, 
telling a manager to maximize current profits, market share, future growth in profits, and anything else one 
pleases will leave that manager with no way to make a reasoned decision. In effect, it leaves the manager 
with no objective.” See Michael C. Jensen “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate 
Objective Function”, 14 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 8, 10-1 (2001) 
33 See Eugene Fama & Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance, Dryden Press, Hinsdale, Ill. (1972) 
34 See Margaret M. Blair “Firm-Specific human Capital and Theories of the Firm”, in Employees and  
Corporate Governance, Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds., Brookings Institution Press (1999), at 60-
3, citing Gary S. Becker Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to 
Education, National Bureau of Economic Research, New York (1964).   
35 See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers. “Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers”, in Corporate 
Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, Alan J. Auerbach ed., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
(1988), at 33-56. They contended that firms usually rely on implicit contracts which the company must be 
trusted to respect. To the extent that long term contracts reduce costs, such trustworthiness is a valuable 
asset to the firm. The need for long term contracts derives from the equal need to promote firm specific 
investment. The problem is that even if ex ante efficient, in certain states of the world it will be ex post 
efficient to breach those contracts. Hence, ex post cost breaching needs to be measured against ex ante 
increase in cost (plus it is more likely to be, at least in part, a redistribution of wealth than anything else).
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only de jure residual claimants in the nexus of contracts, it doesn’t mean that they are the 
only de facto residual claimants.36
 
Other theories, such as the explicit and implicit nexus of contracts,37 the property 
rights theory of the firm38 and the nexus specific investment,39 have been proposed to 
overcome the problems of the explicit nexus of contracts theory.40 Despite important 
differences, all these theories share an important feature: the allocation of residual 
decision rights via ownership can have an effect on investments in relationship specific 
capital (one which has lesser or no value outside the relation for which is created), 
because it determines to some extent ex post distribution of surplus and therefore will 
determine the parties’ willingness to invest ex ante. For example, Hart mentions the case 
of GM ownership of Fisher Body, electricity generating plants owning coal mines, and 
aluminum refineries owning bauxite mines as cases where allocating ownership generates 
lesser possibilities of a hold-up and thereby more efficient ex ante investment.41  
 
These theories of the firm present a more complex structure than the explicit 
nexus of contracts paradigm,42 recognizing the existence of value outside mere 
transaction costs and focusing on the existence of efficient complementarities. Implicit 
contracts and the interaction of specific investments are difficult to understand and value, 
                                                 
36 Milgrom and Roberts suggest that “it may be impossible to identify any individual or group that is the 
unique residual claimant or, indeed, to identify the benefits and costs accruing to any decision and so 
compute the residuals.” See Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & 
MANAGEMENT, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1992), at 315. 
37 See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm”, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39 (2002). 
38 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration”, 94 Journal of Political Economy 691 (1986); Oliver Hart & John Moore “Property 
Rights and the nature of the Firm”, 98 Journal of Political Economy 1119 (1990). 
39 See Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales “Power in a Theory of the Firm”, 113 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 387 (1998); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales “The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A 
Theory of the Origins and Growth of Firms”, 116 Quarterly Journal of Economics 805 (2001). 
40 For an enlightening discussion of different theories of the firm, see Erica Gorga & Michael Halberstam 
“Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge Based Theory of the 
Firm”, 101 Northwestern L. Rev. 1123 (2007). 
41 See Oliver Hart “Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure”, Oxford University Press, New York (1995), 
p. 29- 33, 50-1. For another clear example, see Patrick Bolton & David S. Scharfstein “Corporate Finance, 
the Theory of the Firm, and Organizations”, 12 Journal of Economic Perspectives 95, 98-9 (1998). 
42 See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm”, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39, 70-1 (2002). 
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but their existence implies that there are hidden assets in an organization.43 As a 
consequence, the mere aggregation of financial claims may not accurately represent the 
value of the firm. Further, focusing merely on financial claims to decide what to do with 
the assets of a distressed firm may be suboptimal because it may disrupt an appropriate 
asset allocation and control structure.44 End game situations like bankruptcy maximize 
the importance of control allocation, as the ability of the economic system to penalize 
inefficient actions is considerably diminished.  
            
The preceding discussion suggests that control allocation under different theories 
of the firm may not be innocuous towards incentives beyond mere balancing of agency 
costs of different set of claimants. The next section will look at control allocation costs 
abandoning the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm and will show the existence of other 
costs that need to be taken into account before advancing a definite judgment on the 
desirability of lender control. 
 
III. Single class of claimants and lender control costs 
A. A Simple Model 
In this section, I intend to specifically tie the notions of lender control and the 
theory of the firm in bankruptcy. I present a stylized model drawing from previous work 
by Hart,45 to illustrate ineffiencies that may arise in reorganization under lender control. 
The focus of this section is different from previous work on the matter because it focuses 
on lender control costs where there is only one class of legal claimants. The existence of 
more than one class of legal claimants has been shown to be the source of inefficiencies 
in bankruptcy.46 Hence, I will show that assignment of property rights in reorganization 
                                                 
43 See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1635 (2000). 
44 See George Baker, Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy “Relational Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm”, 117 Quarterly Journal of Economics 39, 41 (2002). 
45 See Oliver D. Hart “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 119, 125-7 (1988). 
46 The problem is closely related to what Hansmann and Kraakman call “liquidation protection” when 
discussing affirmative asset partitioning. See Henry Hasmann & Reinier Kraakman “The Essential Role of 
Organizational Law”, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 403 (2000) (“That threat lies principally in the possibility that 
partial or complete liquidation of the firm's assets could destroy some or all of the firm's going concern 
value, with the result that, even if the firm were to remain solvent after a partial liquidation, the net value 
left to the firm's owners, and available as security for the firm's creditors, might well be reduced”).  
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is not irrelevant, under certain conditions, to the value of a firm and that its effects have 
been overlooked by authors defending the idea of lender control of reorganizations. 
 
This section, hence, illustrates a stylized version of chapter 11 case where, as 
Baird and Rasmussen and Skeel have discussed, a lender is in control of the bankrupt 
debtor47 and, as a result, in control of the proceedings also.48 Unlike general chapter 11 
proceedings, I assume that there is only one class of legal claimants, the lender in control 
(LC) who owns all the debt claims to the firm, and another party, an independent service 
provider (SP), who has the ability to make relationship specific investments. The 
existence of only one source of legal claimants could be interpreted as a situation where a 
firm is so heavily indebted that there is not any plausible scenario under which the lender 
could be fully paid. Alternatively, it could be understood as a situation where one person 
provided all the financing to the firm, as a result being the only equity and debt holder for 
a business which due to a potent financial shock is currently worth a lot less than the face 
value of debt.49 It is important to note that SP is not an employee of the debtor and 
therefore will not generate a claim to salary under the model. This feature of the model is 
not essential, but serves the purpose of highlighting the existence of control related costs 
where there’s only one class of legal claimants.50  
 
At the outset of the model, I am denying the possibility that controlling lenders 
can make any relationship specific investments. Although I acknowledge that this is an 
extreme assumption, there are reasons to believe that it is closely related to lending 
practices. At least in the US, lenders focus seems to be on assessing the viability of 
                                                 
47 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002); 
David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 917 (2003). 
48 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang “Bargaining and the division of value in Corporate 
Reorganization”, 8 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 253 (1992) 
49 Notice that this interpretation doesn’t necessarily mean that the business was originally undercapitalized. 
It is conceivable that a financially healthy business from the onset may become bankrupt after losses and/or 
a financial shock. 
50 In fact, very little would change if SP was an employee with a fixed salary. This presentation is 
admittedly extreme, in the sense that no part of the relationship between LC and SP is subject to an explicit 
contract at date 1. 
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possible investments and in monitoring those investments.51 This specialization in 
monitoring is documented by lenders’ extensive experience on the matter.52 At the same 
time, lenders’ lack of specific knowledge about other type of business’ aspects (i.e. day to 
day running of the firm) is demonstrated by Mann who obtained extensive anecdotal 
information showing that lenders prefer to leave assets with debtors under the expectation 
of higher recovery rates.53  
 
The debtor firm has only one asset producing a profit with certainty (alternatively, 
all the assets of the firm can be thought as a unity where the ability to work with them is 
either given or not). This bankruptcy reorganization model has two periods, 1 and 2. In 
period 1, SP chooses an action e representing relationship specific investment which 
generates a total return at date 2 equal to the value of the firm V(e). SP’s action cannot be 
observed by any other person and makes him incur a private cost equal to e.54 In the case 
that SP does not invest (e=0) then at period 2 firm value is V(0).55 The previous depiction 
of the reorganization time frame is entirely plausible given the reported length of US 
chapter 11 proceedings. For example, Carapeto found the length of the proceedings for 
firms reorganizing after the proposal of the first plan to be on average 272 days, while for 
firms where more than one plan was proposed the average length was 524 days.56 To 
                                                 
51 See Dianna Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux “Monitoring, Loan Renegotiability, and Firm Value: The 
Role of Lending Synicates”, 20 Journal of Banking & Finance 577, 578 (1996) (“The prevalent 
interpretation in the literature is that financial intermediaries provide specialized monitoring, screening, and 
certification services to borrowers”). See also Douglas W. Diamond “Monitoring and Reputation: The 
Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt”, 99 Journal of Political Economy 689 (1991) 
52 Roberts and Sufi who show that more than one quarter of publicly listed firms in the US between 1996 
and 2005 violate a financial covenant at least once. See Michael R. Roberts & Amar Sufi “Control Rights 
and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation”, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962131 (last visited 1/29/08) 
53 See Ronald J. Mann “Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt”, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 159, 178 
(1997) (“When questioned about their reticence to repossess collateral, the account executives uniformly 
pointed to the general success of allowing the debtor to sell the collateral: the executives ordinarily expect 
to get full repayment if they leave collateral in the debtor's possession and rarely expect to get full 
repayment if they do not. Surprisingly, that perception seems to be well justified.”) 
54 It is assumed that SP does not have any financial constraints which would force him to invest a level of e 
inferior to his first best option.  
55 When e=0, LC and SP do not enter into an agreement in date 2 and LC obtains the 100% of V(0). 
56 See Maria Carapeto “Is Bargaining in Chapter 11 Costly?”, Cass Business School Working Paper, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=241569  (2003). This figure is consistent 
with the findings in other studies. See, for example, Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison “Creditor 
Control and Conflict in Chapter 11”, working paper available at 
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keep things as simple as possible, it is assumed that V(e) is deterministic, twice 
differentiable and strictly concave.57  
  
Following Grossman and Hart,58 there is an action involving the asset which can 
be taken at date 2 but cannot be specified in the contract at date 1. This generates 
contractual incompleteness, in turn making residual control rights relevant as whoever is 
in control will be able to obtain a share of any possible benefits arising out of a 
consensual transaction. To show this contractual incompleteness, it is assumed that 
whoever is in control always obtains a non-verifiable fraction (1-α) of V(e), where 
0<α<1. This (1-α) fraction of firm value may be interpreted as if the controlling lender 
presents a reorganization plan where the value of the firm is underscored, so that he can 
obtain a larger portion of resulting business’ equity. Indeed, (1-α) speaks about one of the 
most significant problems in bankruptcy, determining firm value, one that the United 
States reorganization scheme was designed to sidestep.59
 
The remaining share αV(e) is verifiable, and therefore contractible upon in the 
second period. As a result, a contract between LC and SP can only consist of a division of 
the firm’s verifiable return or profits, π=αV(e). As only π is verifiable, SP’s reward upon 
trading depends on it and is represented by a fraction βπ, where 0<β≤1 is the rule the 
parties adopted on the division of any profits arising out of a transaction in period 2.  
  
In order to maximize social efficiency and regardless of who is in control, the 
investment should work to maximize V(e)-e. As LC controls the firm, SP settles at date 1 
for a level of e knowing that LC will obtain at least the fraction of value (1-α)V(e) and 
maybe more depending on LC’s bargaining power. Therefore, SP works to maximize his 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.law.duke.edu/conference/triangle/morrison_chapter11.pdf (last visited 5/02/07) (reporting that 
firms stay in bankruptcy an average of 15 months) 
57 Ergo, V’(e)>0 and V”(e)<0. 
58 See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical 
and Lateral Integration”, 94 Journal of Political Economy 691, 696 (1986) (“We have in mind a situation in 
which it is prohibitively difficult to think about and describe unambiguously in advance how all the 
potentially relevant aspects of the production allocation should be chosen as a function of the many states 
of the world”). 
59 One of the principal innovations of the Bankruptcy Code was to use voting in Chapter 11 in order to 
avoid the need for the court to perform cumbersome valuations.  
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private benefit βαV(e)-e. It follows that because β≤1 (which is the case as (1-α)V(e) is 
not contractible) SP will not capture the full value deriving from his effort. Contrasting 
this case to the one where SP controls the firm60 and invests in order to maximize both 
the verifiable and non-verifiable part  
(1-α)V(e)+αV(e)-e 
confirms the intuition that in the former scenario SP’s investment decision will not be 
socially optimal.61 Only when SP controls the firm’s asset the investment level allows 
achieving the first-best.  
 
 This simple model shows that, under conditions of contractual incompleteness 
(which allow value divertion) and relationship specific investments, the value of a firm 
may heavily depend on control allocation. In fact, Hart states that giving the party 
capable of making a value enhancing relationship specific investment “entitlement to the 
asset's profit stream will not be enough since an outside owner may be able to divert 
some of the asset's return for his own uses, thus dulling the manager's incentives.”62 In 
the same spirit, Blair and Stout state, while discussing the importance of legal personality 
of corporations, that “Specific investment is discouraged when individual investors have 
a legal right to prematurely withdraw their contributions (and with it, the ability to 
opportunistically threaten to withdraw in order to “hold up” their fellow investors in an 
attempt to extract a larger share of the surplus generated by corporate activity).”63
 
B. Relaxing the restriction on the number of claimholders 
Allowing for the introduction of more than one class of claimholders, or even just 
more than one claimholder in the same class, does not provide a rosier picture. In fact, 
when LC is not the only claimholder (i.e. where there is a class of equityholders and/or 
junior creditors), which is usually the case in corporate reorganization proceedings, his 
claim will have a cap (C). This cap limits the ability of LC of reaping benefits from 
                                                 
60 Ergo, SP doesn’t need to share with LC (1-β)αV(e) either  
61 This follows from the assumption that V(e) is twice differentiable and strictly concave which means that 
V(e) will have a larger value than αV(e) for any value of e. 
62 See Oliver D. Hart “Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm”, 4 Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organization 119, 127 (1988). 
63 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout “Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law”, 
31 Iowa J. Corp. L. 719, 730 (2006) 
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reorganization in two ways: it makes C the maximum LC can obtain from (1-β)αV(e); in 
addition the maximum LC will be able to divert to himself from underscoring the value 
of reorganization is also capped. The cap on the divertion amount is also derived from C, 




])V-[(1 αβα  
because )() e
C
V-(1 αβ  is the maximum percentage of stock assignable to LC under a 
reorganization plan. The relative importance of the cap on a controlling lender is 
apparent. For corporate bankruptcies in the second part of 2001, Ayotte and Morrison 
report that ratio of secured debt to assets in the filing schedules was 0.65. This figure 
likely represents a higher bound on the ratio as there is a significant drop in the value of 
the assets reported in the last 10-K relative to the figure reported in the bankruptcy 
schedules.64   
 
Unfortunately, these effects are not beneficial to SP or more generally any party 
making relationship specific investments (unless the intersection of the set of relationship 
specific investors and the set of other claimholders is non empty). Further, they may be 
prejudicial as it makes any liquidation strategy (usually generating smaller returns) more 
attractive to LC as his benefits from reorganization are reduced. In turn, making the 
liquidation strategy more appealing to LC boosts his bargaining position, which generally 
means that β is smaller and negatively affects SP’s ex ante investment.  
 
The analysis above did not take into account an additional factor which is at the 
heart of lender control: security interests.65 As long as LC is over-secured his ability to 
gain from any growth in V(e) in good states of the world, as mentioned earlier, is partly 
reaped by other claimholders. The other claimholders, though, do not share in the same 
                                                 
64 The mean value of assets reported in the last 10-K in their sample was 122.81 millions, while the median 
value of the assets reported in the bankruptcy schedules was 37.34 millions.  
65 Ayotte and Morrison have recently conducted an empirical investigation of this issue, finding that when 
secured creditors are oversecured reorganization cases are significantly shorter and more likely to result in 
a sale. See Keneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison “Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11”, 
working paper available at http://www.law.duke.edu/conference/triangle/morrison_chapter11.pdf (last 
visited 5/02/07).  
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way with the losses that may occur in the bad states of the world. Hence, LC’s 
assessment of the growth in V will be biased again making the liquidation option more 
viable, further reducing β and affecting the ex ante investment in e. 
 
C. Inefficient restrictions to business plans 
Start-up firms financed by venture capital firms (VC) have been related to 
distressed firms, because in both cases the investors have to deal with robust conflict of 
interests.66 According to Kaplan, Sensoy and Stromberg it is possible and likely that VC 
firms place implicit constraints in business plan modifications67 because they invested 
their money in a certain business plan.68 This situation is in sharp contrast from the 
evidence on adaptation obtained by Bhide on other start-ups lacking VC funding.69 Bhide 
discusses many entrepreneurs who started successful businesses without a detailed 
business plan at all and little funds. In the case of these entrepreneurs, the success of their 
ventures depends heavily on opportunistic adaptation, rather than merely following ex 
ante ideas. As a result, it appears that VC firms in their attempt to limit conflict of 
interests also restrict the set of growth opportunities.  
 
Most likely, the same scenario appears with a lender in control. Conditional on 
the conjecture of similarity between distressed and start-ups’ firms, controlling lenders of 
distressed firms will tend to constrain more business plan changes or adaptations limiting 
the ability of distressed firms to gain on unexpected opportunities. The fundamental 
reason behind the adaptation ability difference is the relatively poorer ability of a 
controlling lender to attribute unexpected events to the right causes due in large part to 
                                                 
66 See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg “Financial Contracting Meets the Real World: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts”, 70 Review of Financial Studies 281, (2003). 
67 See Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy & Per Stromberg “What Are Firms? Evolution from Birth to 
Public Companies”, working paper available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11581.pdf (last visited 
1/29/2008), at 30. 
68 Referring to corporations (as banks or lenders in general) preference towards investments, Bhide states 
“The nature og the evidence required by corporate decision-makers leads them to favor initiatives where 
the risks and returns can be objectively assessed.” See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New 
Business, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 120 
69 See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Business, Oxford University Press, New York, 
NY (2000), at 53-68. 
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the lack of expertise in the particular venture.70 It should be noted that this investment 
scope restriction is separate and complementary to an investment magnitude restriction 
imposed by lenders when firms’ performance is poor.71
 
Ambiguity appears to play a role in a controlling lender decision-making process 
also.72 According to Camerer, ambiguity is “known to be missing information”.73 Several 
experiments, following Ellsberg’s famous paradox,74 have shown that people are prone to 
have aversion towards ambiguity.75 Interestingly, a person’s attitude towards ambiguity 
is unrelated to her attitude towards risk.76 Therefore, the fact that a lender has extensive 
expertise on decisionmaking in general (i.e. takes risks neutral decisions) does not 
immediately translate into adequate decisions when there is ambiguity involved. 
Expertise has been identified as an offsetting factor for ambiguity aversion.77 Despite 
their ability to analyze investments,78 it is unlikely that controlling lenders will be willing 
to invest on gaining the necessary experience to offset the ambiguity aversion in a 
particular firm, as it is not their forte.  
 
The investment scope restriction and ambiguity aversion arguments would further 
suggest that lenders are suboptimal controlling parties not just due to Myers’ 
                                                 
70 Bhide considers that the capacity for adaptation depends on the entrepreneurs decisiveness, open-
mindedness, managing internal conflict and attribution skills. See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and 
Evolution of New Business, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 99-104. 
71 See Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi “Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy”, 
working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=928688, p. 3 (last checked 
11/23/07) (“whether a loan includes an investment restriction is often more sensitive to changes in firm 
performance than amendments to interest rates and collateral requirements”). See also, Amar Sufi “Banks 
Lines of Credit in Corporate Finance: An Empirical Analysis”, working paper available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=723361 (last visited 1/30/08), at 25 (“Even controlling 
for the financial factors leading to covenant violations, a covenant violation has an independently large and 
statistically significant effect on the availability of lines of credit”) 
72 It is unclear whether ambiguity aversion causes the restriction on business’ plan adaptations, are both 
generated by a different phenomenon or are completely independent. 
73 See Colin F. Camerer “Individual Decision Making”, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1995, at 645. 
74 See Daniel Ellsberg “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms” 75 Quarterly Journal of Economics 643 
(1961) 
75 See Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky ‘‘Who Accepts Savage’s Axioms?’’ 19 Behavioral Science 368 (1974) 
76 See Colin F. Camerer “Individual Decision Making”, in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J 1995, at 646 
77 See Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Business, Oxford University Press, New York, 
NY (2000), at 97 
78 See section III.A supra 
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underinvestment argument or a preference towards low volatility projects, but also due to 
credibility problems for project alterations: a project modification would require the 
lender to incur additional investigation costs to assess its profitability while his 
investment upside would remain the same. Hence, the lender would tend to disfavor 
investing new money and would favor a sale of the business. Intimately related, if a 
controlling lender limits the investment opportunity set, it may foster an expectation of 
failure which in itself could trigger actual failure.79
    
D. Summary 
I have shown that broadening the view of the theory of the firm permits to see that 
lender control poses costs non-investigated before. In addition, the above discussion 
shows that lender control social costs are boosted by the costs of lender control 
discovered under the nexus of explicit contracts. Finally, I exposed the fact that lender 
control may also constrain the investment opportunity set in order to exclude sizable 
business plan changes. Therefore, when considering control allocations in lengthy 
processes as chapter 11, the above analysis suggest that having a controlling lender at the 
helm may be as bad as having equityholders there. It follows that policymakers reflecting 
on bankruptcy reform should try to move beyond either possibility. The following section 
uses these intuitions to argue that lender control liability should serve to penalize self-
serving behavior which runs counter to the optimal use of the assets. 
 
IV. Lender control liability and functionally related theories  
As the previous section has shown, DIP lender control may generate ex ante 
inefficient investment even in the absence of conflict of interests between legal 
claimholders. This section argues that the theory of the firm is further useful in providing 
a rationale for lender control liability and functionally related theories whose role has 
been dwarfed under current interpretations.80 In fact, I argue that once the explicit nexus 
                                                 
79 For a similar point made on start-ups, see Amar V. Bhide, The Origin and Evolution of New Business, 
Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2000), at 72. 
80 See William H. Lawrence “Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications 
to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1389 (1989) 
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of contracts theory is abandoned lender control liability theories’ can regain their proper 
role as deterrent of socially inefficient behavior.  
 
A. A System with no Bite 
Control inspired theories of lender liability have an important pedigree line in the 
United States dating at least as far back as Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore County 
et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co.81 Nonetheless, and despite its increased sophistication, a long 
line of precedents in this area does not translate into much clarity, at least beyond the 
objective of preserving equality of distribution.82 For example, since In The Matter of 
Mobile Steel Co., in order to subordinate certain claims there is a clear test requiring a 
combination of inequitable conduct and either unfair advantage or injury to other 
creditors,83 but what amounts to inequitable conduct remains vague. The same can be 
said about the law of agency for those cases where there is no explicit consent by the 
agent to be acting on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control.84 Nor 
have legal scholars’ work eradicated the uncertainty.85 As a result, it is not farfetched to 
think that lender control liability theories have been applied as a reaction to situations 
                                                 
81 See Baltimore & O. Tel. Co. of Baltimore County et al. v. Interstate Tel. Co., 54 Fed. 50 (4th Circuit, 
1893) 
82 This equality of distribution is no more than a default rule from contract and property law. See Henry 
Hasmann & Reinier Kraakman “The Essential Role of Organizational Law”, 110 Yale L.J. 387, 407 (2000) 
(“The default rules of property and contract law in effect provide that, absent contractual agreement to the 
contrary, each of the entrepreneur's creditors has an equal-priority floating lien upon the entrepreneur's 
entire pool of assets as a guarantee of performance.”) 
83 See In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692, 699-700 (3rd Circuit, 1977) (“… three 
conditions must be satisfied before exercise of the power of equitable subordination is appropriate. 
(i) The claimant must have engaged in some type of inequitable conduct; (ii) The misconduct must have 
resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant; (iii) 
Equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.”) 
84 See “Restatement of the Law Third, Agency”, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota 
Vol. 1 p. 17 (2006). The Restatement defines agency as a “fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a “principal”) manifests assent to another person (an “agent”) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise 
consents so to act” 
85 For example, Professor Lawrence has considered that “Lender control is neither illegal nor inherently 
bad. Control, however, is easily subjected to a variety of excesses and abuses, so legal responses are 
justified to keep such behavior in check.” See William H. Lawrence “Lender Control Liability: An 
Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 62 S. Cal. 
L. Rev. 1387, 1390 (1989). It is not clear what exactly constitutes abuse but, as a result of the abuse backed 
reasoning, some scholars call for the substitution of lender liability by fiduciary duty principles. See 
William H. Lawrence “Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model Illustrated with Applications to the 
Relational Theory of Secured Financing”, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1423-30 (1989). 
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strongly suggesting a “sense of wrongdoing” from an equality standpoint, rather than the 
implementation of a systematic approach.  
 
A more in depth look into prominent lender control liability cases deriving from 
the law of agency and equitable subordination seems to reaffirm this theory. A milestone 
case from the law of agency is A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.86 In Jenson 
Farms, Cargill, the creditor, financed Warren’s, the debtor, grain elevator operation and 
purchased the majority of the its grain. Cargill also made constant recommendations to 
Warren, as it believed that the debtor needed strong paternal guidance. After Warren 
ceased operations, other creditors sued Cargill under the theory that Cargill became liable 
as a principal of Warren on contracts made by the debtor with the farmers. Minnesota’s 
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment finding that an agency relationship was established 
because Cargill became a principal when it assumed de facto control over the conduct of 
his debtor as an active participant in the debtor's operations, made key economic 
decisions and decided whether to keep the debtor in existence. The court stated “By 
directing Warren to implement its recommendations, Cargill manifested its consent that 
Warren would be its agent. Warren acted on Cargill's behalf in procuring grain for Cargill 
as the part of its normal operations which were totally financed by Cargill. Further, an 
agency relationship was established by Cargill's interference with the internal affairs of 
Warren, which constituted de facto control of the elevator.”87  
 
Despite being frequently cited as a way to explain lender control liability, Jenson 
Farms doesn’t provide a clear understanding of why it is desirable to subject a controlling 
creditor to liability (when limited liability is readily available for equity holders) nor what 
should the extent of that liability be.88 The same could be said of equitable subordination 
                                                 
86  See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 1981). 
Another important case involving agency law is Buck v Nash-Finch Company, 78 S.D. 334; 102 N.W.2d 84 
(Supreme Court of South Dakota, 1960). 
87 See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minnesota Supreme Court, 1981). 
88 There is, nonetheless, a limit on the amount of the awards, as lender control liability theories generally 
have a retributional character (unless a statute determine otherwise). See “Restatement of the Law Third, 
Agency”, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, Minnesota Vol. 2 p. 115-23 (2006). 
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cases. In the famous Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co.,89 the court found that 
Standard Gas & Electric had operative control of Deep Rock, the debtor. A majority of 
Deep Rock's officers were officers or directors of Standard or Standard’s parent 
corporation. The officers of Deep Rock reported to and were always subject to the 
direction of officers and directors of Standard. In addition, the fiscal affairs “were wholly 
controlled by Standard, which was its banker and its only source of financial aid.”90 
When Standard tried to obtain a controlling position in the reorganized firm, the Supreme 
Court ordered that “No plan ought to be approved which does not accord the preferred 
stockholders a right of participation in the equity in the Company's assets prior to that of 
Standard”91 because Deep Rock was bankrupt as a result of “the abuses in management 
due to the paramount interest of interlocking officers and directors in the preservation of 
Standard's position, as at once proprietor and creditor of Deep Rock.”92 Once again, the 
questions regarding the reason behind the desirability of lender control liability and the 
extent of that liability remain largely unanswered. 
  
Perhaps as a reaction against this lack of clarity, there has been a steady stream of 
cases objecting to the existence of lender control liability. The trend can be seen in cases 
such as In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company,93 In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing 
Company, Inc.,94 Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting,95 In the 
Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v Associates Commercial Corporation,96 
Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital 
Corporation,97 Schwan's Sales Enters. v Commerce Bank & Trust Co.,98 Mike Smith v 
                                                 
89 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). Another landmark case involving 
equitable subordination is Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939) 
90 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 311 (1939) 
91 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 324 (1939) 
92 See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939) 
93 See In The Matter of Mobile Steel Company, 563 F2d 692 (3rd Circuit, 1977) 
94 See In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc., 46 B.R. 125 (Bkrtcy.D.Ea.Penn., 1985) 
95 See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th circuit, 1990) 
96 See In the Matter of Clark Pipe and Supply Co., Inc. v. Associates Commercial Corporation, 893 F.2d 
693 (5th Circuit, 1990) 
97 See Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, 247 
F.3d 471 (3rd Circuit, 2001) 
98 See Schwan's Sales Enters. v. Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 189 (U.S. District Court of 
Massachusetts, 2005) 
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Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al,99 and Henry v Lehman Commercial Paper,100 all of 
which appear to limit the extent to which remedies on controlling lenders can be 
applied.101 In this counter-wave, the first line of defense against findings of liability 
comes from a safe harbor obtained from agency law theory. As a way of distinguishing 
what controlling parties may do without becoming principals, the Restatement suggests 
that the difference between mere influence and control depends on the consent given by 
the agent to the exercise of that dominance.102 Therefore, the formality of an agreement 
between parties on the way forward prevents the lender from being deemed in active 
control of the debtor. For example, in Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology 
Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, Chief Judge Becker considered that 
“…we must be scrupulous in our efforts to distinguish between situations in which a 
parent/lender has ultimately assumed responsibility for the continuing viability of a 
company… and situations in which the borrower has retained the ultimate responsibility 
for keeping the company active.”103  
 
                                                 
99 See Mike Smith v. Ajax Magnathermic Corp., et. al, 144 Fed. Appx. 482 (6th Circuit, 2005) 
100 See Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, 471 F3d 977 (9th Circuit, 2006) 
101 A notable exception comes from Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation, 828 F.2d 686 
(11th Circuit, 1987), where the court reversed a summary judgment which considered that Citibank (the 
lender) was not a principal of Data Lease (the debtor) (“In determining whether an agency relationship 
exists between Citibank and the third party defendants, the key issue is control and domination… In his 
deposition, Joseph Stefan made the following admission: Q. Did you work for Citibank? A. At the bottom 
of everything the answer would be yes. They put me there and they took me out. Stefan further testified that 
he worked in close coordination with Citibank on "major matters", including major changes of policy. 
Finally, Stefan described his displeasure with Miami National's head of operations and his inability to 
remove the man from office: Q. Why couldn't you get rid of Mr. Connor? A. He was there at the wishes of 
Citibank and they would have to remove him.”, Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial Corporation, 828 
F.2d 686, 691-2)  
102 “A relationship is one of agency only if the person susceptible to dominance or influence has consented 
to act on behalf of the other and the other has a right of control, not simply an ability to bring influence to 
bear.” See “Restatement of the Law Third, Agency”, American Law Institute Publishers, St. Paul, 
Minnesota Vol. 1 p. 28 (2006). A similar test can be found for example in Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant 
Technologies Inc. noting that “the test to determine whether a principal-agent relationship exists is whether 
the alleged principal has the right to control the agent, and whether the alleged agent can affect the legal 
relationships of the principal.” See Chemtool, Inc. v. Lubricant Technologies Inc., 148 F.3d 742 (7th Circuit, 
1998). This consensual characteristic sets apart the agency definition of control from the definitions of 
power in the social sciences. For example, Professor Dowding classifies power in outcome power, “the 
ability of an actor to bring about or help to bring about outcomes” and social power, “the ability of an actor 
deliberately to change the incentive structure of another actor or actors to bring about or help to bring about 
outcomes”, without any references to consent or assent as the Restatement section 1 comment f does. See 
Keith Dowding “Power”, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN (1996), at 5.  
103 See Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric Capital Corporation, 
247 F.3d 471, 506 (3rd Circuit, 2001). 
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As a second part of the strategy, courts combine the previous reasoning with 
equitable subordination special considerations in cases where the party who allegedly 
acted in an inequitable manner was not an insider. For example, in In re Ludwig Honold 
Manufacturing Company, Inc., the court held that “a creditor who is not an insider is 
under no fiduciary obligation to its debtor or to other creditors of the debtor in the 
collection of its claim.”104 In Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, the court expressed 
that “Where non-insider, non-fiduciary claims are involved, as is the case here, the level 
of pleading and proof is elevated: gross and egregious conduct will be required before a 
court will equitably subordinate a claim.”105  
 
This counter-wave of cases is heavily defended from a contractual freedom point 
of view. For example, in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting Judge 
Easterbrook mentioned that “…we are not willing to embrace a rule that requires 
participants in commercial transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do ‘more’ 
- just how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the 
situation years later… Courts may not convert one form of contract into the other after 
the fact, without raising the cost of credit or jeopardizing its availability. Unless pacts are 
enforced according to their terms, the institution of contract, with all the advantages 
private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized.”106 This reasoning has been 
embraced by courts in similar situations, as it can be seen in Trenwick America Litigation 
Trust v. Ernst & Young.107 In Trenwick, while discussing a claim for deepening 
insolvency and the existence of creditor protection under Delaware Law, the Delaware 
Chancery Court stated “And Delaware public policy is strongly supportive of freedom of 
contract, thereby supporting the primary means by which creditors protect themselves - 
through the negotiations of toothy contractual provisions securing their right to seize on 
the assets of the borrowing subsidiary.”108 Therefore, in order to limit the negative extent 
                                                 
104 See In re Ludwig Honold Manufacturing Company, Inc., 46 B.R. 125, 128 (Bkrtcy. D. Ea. Penn., 1985) 
105 See Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, 471 F3d 977, 1006 (9th Circuit, 2006) 
106 See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1356-7 (7th circuit, 1990). 
107 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168 (Del. Ch., 2006) 
108 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 173 (Del. Ch., 2006). In 
addition, the court considered that “So long as directors are respectful of the corporation's obligation to 
honor the legal rights of its creditors, they should be free to pursue in good faith profit for the corporation's 
equityholders. Even when the firm is insolvent, directors are free to pursue value maximizing strategies, 
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of their rulings on the credit market, courts consistently decide that a creditor exercising 
his contractual rights can not be subject to wrongdoing. 
 
It appears, then, that the objective of equality of distribution which has been put 
forward so far as the rationale behind lender control liability theories may not be actually 
accomplished, as these theories have little, if any, impact on creditors’ behavior. The 
impact on lender behavior must indeed be relatively trivial when the trend signaling the 
absence of lender control liability is combined by a recent steady stream of legal 
academics claiming that creditors are calling the shots in reorganization proceedings.109 
A similar type of claim can regularly be found in the financial literature.110 Although 
many situations are likely engineered to prevent any sort of control taking by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
while recognizing that the firm's creditors have become its residual claimants and the advancement of their 
best interests has become the firm's principal objective.” See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & 
Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 174-5 (Del. Ch., 2006). Contrast the former to the role of the administrator 
under the UK Enterprise Act (2002). As Armour and Mokal put it “The new administration regime, by 
providing for out-of-court appointment by a floating charge holder, is designed to capture many of the 
benefits of the information acquired by banks about their customers. However, the revised procedure is also 
designed to ensure that the bank’s appointee is genuinely accountable to all creditors.” See John Armour & 
Rizwaan J. Mokal “Reforming the Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise Act of 2002”, Lloyds 
Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 28, 29 (2005)  
109 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “The End of Bankruptcy”, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 751 (2002); 
Lynn M. LoPucki “The Nature of the Bankrupt Firm: A Response to Baird and Rasmussen’s The End of 
Bankruptcy”, 56 Stan, L. Rev. 645 (2003); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “Chapter 11 at 
Twilight”, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 673 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr. “Creditors’ Ball: The “New” New Corporate 
Governance in Chapter 11”, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 917 (2003); David A. Skeel, Jr. “The Past, Present and 
Future of Debtor-in-Possession Financing”, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1905 (2004); Stephen Lubben “The “New 
and Improved” Chapter 11”, 93 Kentucky Law Journal 839 (2004); Barry E. Adler “Bankruptcy 
Primitives”, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 219 (2004); Jay L. Westbrook “Bankruptcy Control of the 
Recovery Process”, 12 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 245 (2004); Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman “Is 
Chapter 11 Bankrupt?”, 47 B. C. L. Rev. 129 (2005); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen “Private 
Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance”, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1209 (2006); Keneth M. Ayotte 
& Edward R. Morrison “Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11”, working paper available at 
http://www.law.duke.edu/conference/triangle/morrison_chapter11.pdf (last visited 5/02/07); Douglas G. 
Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen “The Prime Directive”, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 921 (2007); Adam Feibelman 
“Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce”, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 943 (2007). The 
disagreement among these authors is relative to the beneficial effects of lender control, not its existence.  
110 See, for example, Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts “How Does Financing Impact Investment? The 
Role of Debt Covenants”, forthcoming Journal of Finance, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=854324 (last visited 2/1/08), at 2 (“However, the instant 
that the borrower's net worth falls below this threshold, regardless of the amount, control rights shift to the 
creditor, who can then use the threat of accelerating the loan to take any number of actions that may impact 
the investment policy of the firm (e.g., increasing the interest rate on the loan, shortening the maturity of 
the loan, reducing the available funds, or directly intervening in the investment decisions of the firm). Thus, 
the distance to the covenant threshold is irrelevant for the purpose of understanding how the violation and 
subsequent transfer of control rights impact investment). 
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lender,111 it can not be the case that this is what happens in every case unless all the 
previous authors are wrong.112 Therefore, lending practices and case law seem to be 
talking to each other in different tongues.  
 
B. Beyond the Explicit Nexus of Contracts Paradigm 
In this subsection, I argue that, at least in part, the previously described “control 
disconnect” derives from an understanding of the theory of the firm similar to the explicit 
nexus of contracts theory. As it was noted in section II, the explicit nexus of contracts 
theory looks at firms as mere ways of connecting contracts which fully pay everyone but 
the shareholders their opportunity costs.113 This has been the traditional way of looking at 
lender liability, as can be seen in Fischel’s analysis.114 Accordingly, this theory deeply 
believes in the freedom of contracts as a wealth creating mechanism. The string of 
thought is as follows: if freedom of contracts is limited, then the possible set of contract 
permutations and combinations that may generate a firm gets reduced. As a result, there 
exists the possibility that value enhancing combinations are left out and social efficiency 
                                                 
111 There is evidence of this legal engineering. See Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan “Bankers on 
Boards: Monitoring, Conflict of Interests, and Lender Liability”, 62 Journal of Financial Economics 415, 
417-8 (2001) (“Our analysis shows that bankers tend to be on the boards of firms in which shareholder–
creditor conflicts are likely to be relatively unimportant. Typically, these firms are large and stable and 
have a high fraction of tangible assets and a low level of short-term financing in their capital structure… At 
low levels of risk, the benefits of monitoring appear to dominate, while at higher levels of risk, the conflict 
of interest costs and lender liability concerns become more important.” “There is an important tradeoff in 
the U.S. between the benefits to firms of active monitoring and the costs of potential conflicts of interest 
and lender liability”). In addition, the use of chapter 11 sales is indicative of measures taken to avoid lender 
control liability. 
112 In addition, it could be claimed that the recent escalation of cases claiming “deepening insolvency” has 
been a practical answer to courts closing the lender control liability possibility. On the escalation deepening 
insolvency cases, see Gerald L. Blanchard “Recent Developments in the Area of Lender Liability Law”, 
Ann. Surv. of Bankr. Law Part I S 3 (2006) (“the year saw continued development in the area of deepening 
insolvency”).     
113 See Luigi Zingales “In search for New Foundations”, 55 Journal of Finance 1623, 1630 (2000). 
114 For example, when Fischel discusses damages arising due to lender liability he says that “the 
relationship between a lender and a borrower is contractual.” See Daniel R. Fischel “The Economics of 
Lender Liability”, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 148 (1989). Also, when considering the source of liability, Fischel 
looks at opportunistic behavior: “Opportunistic behavior occurs whenever one party attempts to obtain, at 
the expense of the other, a benefit not contemplated by the initial agreement, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Thus, whenever a lender attempts to renegotiate with the borrower for better terms when there is no basis 
for doing so, the lender is behaving opportunistically”. See Daniel R. Fischel “The Economics of Lender 
Liability”, 99 Yale L. J. 131, 138 (1989). Even though Fischel talks about implicit contract terms, he 
doesn’t view the existence of non-contractability as a possibility, as on this particular point he relies on the 
analysis of Muris, who explicitly considers that “the victim would have avoided the problem [of 
opportunism] so long as the costs of prevention were less than the expected costs of the opportunism.” See 
Timothy J. Muris “Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts”, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 524 (1981).  
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is not achieved. Following this logic, it comes to no surprise to encounter claims like the 
ones found in the Kham Shoes or Trenwick opinions cited above.115  
 
The above description of freedom of contracts when combined with the explicit 
nexus of contracts paradigm and agency law’s negative control safe harbor is misleading. 
The problem arises because the combination of those theories’ assumptions determines 
what the causes for unfairness and damages can be.116 If two parties enter into a contract 
without incurring in any sort of fraudulent or misrepresenting behavior, then because they 
have acted within their scope of freedom and by assumption other parties are paid their 
full opportunity cost for their services, the parties’ conduct cannot be considered unfair 
nor produce damages unless the contract is breached.117 This reasoning can be seen in, 
for example, Adams v. Erwin Weller Co.,118 a case arising for responsibility for backpay 
and benefits owed to employees when their employer closed without giving them sixty 
days written notification, as required under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining 
Notification (WARN) Act.119 A class of employees moved to collect against 
Westinghouse Credit Corporation, the main lender of the employer, under the theory that 
through its financing it had become the principal. While denying the employees claim, 
Judge Fagg stated Westinghouse Credit Corporation’s “use of legitimate financial 
controls to protect its security interest does not make [Westinghouse Credit Corporation] 
an employer under WARN.”120  
 
Interestingly, lender control liability theories interpreted under the umbrella of the 
explicit nexus of contracts theory are reduced to exactly the same role as the absolute 
                                                 
115 For another example, see Thomas Pearson v. Component Technology Corporation; General Electric 
Capital Corporation, 247 F.3d 471, 502 (3rd Circuit, 2001) (“We do not intend to create a jurisprudence 
that discourages loans in general or rescues of troubled business enterprises in particular”) 
116 This is very important, as some courts recognize that certain cases may generate equitable subordination 
without a specific proof of inequitable conduct. See In The Matter of Virtual Network Services 
Corporation, 902 F.2d 1246, 1250 (7th Circuit, 1990) (“In sum, we conclude that § 510(c)(1) authorizes 
courts to equitably subordinate claims to other claims on a case-by-case basis without requiring in every 
instance inequitable conduct on the part of the creditor claiming parity among other unsecured general 
creditors”) See also United States v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535, 540 (1996) 
117 This is where control by a lender becomes important, as without control a lender could not 
opportunistically breach a contract 
118 See Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269 (8th Circuit, 1996) 
119 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 
120 See Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269, 272 (8th Circuit, 1996) 
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priority rule121 for those cases where the lender did not incur in any fraudulent or 
misrepresenting behavior. The absolute priority rule codifies a judge-made rule providing 
that any plan of reorganization in which claimholders of lower priority obtain payment 
when claimholders of higher priority are not fully compensated is invalid.122 And exactly 
this is the scope of what can be achieved, at least for voluntary creditors, when lender 
control liability theories are restricted by the explicit nexus of contracts theory and 
agency law notions of negative control.  
   
Only after we move away from the explicit nexus of contracts paradigm, can 
lender control liability theories regain a proper role. Their role should be to penalize self-
serving behavior that a controlling lender imposed on the firm when that behavior runs 
counter to socially desirable behavior. In practical terms, lender control liability should 
work in a similar way as compensatory liability work under general tort law theory: 
lender control liability should impose a penalty ex post which would make the lender take 
efficient actions ex ante.123 Such an understanding would be consistent with the idea 
championed by Professor Shavell that damages basically should operate to achieve only 
optimal deterrence of injurers.124   
   
Although broadening the scope of lender control liability theories permits to 
reposition them in such a way as to promote socially efficient decisionmaking by the 
controlling lender, it should be noted that their effect over a party with the ability to make 
relationship specific investments is limited. Lender control liability theories impose a 
penalty on a lender whose strategy was self serving, but this doesn’t fully restore the 
incentives of a service provider to invest in order to achieve the first best. There are cases 
when even though the impact of lender control liability will cause the controlling lender 
to ex post act in a socially efficient manner, the amount of relationship specific 
                                                 
121 See 11 U.S.C. §1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) (“the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such 
class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or interest any property”) 
122 See In re Iridium Operating LLC, 478 F.3d 452, 463 (2nd Circuit, 2007) 
123 Recently, Baird and Rasmussen have called to reconsider the role of lender control liability theories in 
order to promote the ex ante incentives of lenders to monitor and control the debtors when it is efficient for 
them to do so. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert. K. Rasmussen “The Prime Directive”, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
921, 939-40 (2007) 
124 See Steven M. Shavell “Strict Liability versus Negligence”, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 1, 2-9 (1980)  
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investments will be smaller than the social optimal. Nonetheless, it is not clear whether in 
these later situations having a controlling lender would be worse or better than having the 
debtor remain in control.125 Therefore, imposing liability on a lender merely for gaining 
control doesn’t seem appropriate. 
 
It should be noted, nevertheless, that the prescribed role for lender control could 
not be fully achieved if the agency law formalistic distinction between positive and 
negative control is not dropped. This categorization seems to have little to do with reality 
(as both legal and finance scholars regularly point to actual transfers of control achieved 
only through negative control)126 and may be generating worse problems (though masked 
ones) than the ones it is intended to solve. Further, lender counsel claims such as “the dire 
consequences [for their clients] of lender involvement in a borrower’s business” haven’t 
been demonstrated in any way.127 The following section analyses problems derived from 
lender control strict liability and connected to the voiced fears of biased judgments 
against lenders. 
 
V. Hindsight Bias, Strict Liability and other Heuristics  
So far, I have used the theory of the firm to show that lender control may generate 
inefficiencies regarding legally not recognized claims, regardless of the existence of more 
than one class of legal claimants. In addition, I have used the intuitions from the theory of 
the firm to show a proper role for lender control liability theories. Lender control liability 
may need to be constrained if adjudicating problems due to cognitive errors impedes 
                                                 
125 For authors (focusing on agency problems) suggesting that contingent creditor control is more efficient, 
see Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting”, 59 
Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992); Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole “Biased Principals as a 
Discipline Device”, 8 Japan and the World Economy 195 (1996). Langevoort has defended the idea that 
introducing outside directors may help to limit inside corporate directors’ overoptimism. The same 
argument could be used in favor of lender control. See Donald C. Langevoort “The Human Nature of 
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability”, 
89 Geo. L.J. 797, 803 (2001)  
126 Agency law has had this distinction even before the appearance of the explicit nexus of contracts theory 
of the firm, as can be seen on section 14(o) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency Law (1958). 
Nonetheless, it could be argued that the emergence of this theory has served to support this categorization. 
It could be argued, though, that the negative control category is, argued other contexts an “attempt to avoid 
relying on hindsight by identifying an ex ante norm to apply.” See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Heuristics and 
Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?”, 79 Or. L. Rev. 61, 72 (2000) 
127 See John C. Joyce “Lender Liability: The Problem Is still with Us”, 115 Banking L. J. 477, 483 (1998).  
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achieving its purpose. Hindsight bias has been signaled as the reason behind those limits. 
This section will analyze damage assessments to show that control based theories need to 
cope not just with hindsight bias but also with anchoring.        
 
A. Hindsight Bias and Anchoring 
A common argument against lender control liability comes from the perils of 
unevenly heard cases by both juries and judges. This fear is associated to the inability of 
adjudicators, juries and judges, to correctly understand business decisionmaking (i.e. due 
to their lack of expertise on the matter) and the likelihood that they will incur in 
systematic errors due to cognitive biases.128 The former criticism is largely limited by the 
specificity of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction. The later problem, hindsight bias, seems to 
remain strong.   
 
The risk of opinions tainted by hindsight bias, in connection with the strict 
liability character of lender control liability theories, has generated sharp criticism. For 
example, Hynes believes that it creates a dilemma for a controlling creditor: “The more 
critical the financial condition of a business, the more control the creditor will want to 
assert in an effort to keep the business in a state of solvency and thus able to repay its 
debts. Yet the more control the creditor asserts, the greater risk it runs under the common 
law of agency of incurring personal liability for the debts of the business”.129 In addition, 
supporters of limiting lenders liability also look into comparisons with the business 
judgment rule (BJR).130 If under BJR a manager is not liable unless there’s some sort of 
                                                 
128 For an example of concern over hindsight bias in the business setting, see In The Matter of Mobile Steel 
Company, 563 F2d 692, 702-3 (3rd Circuit, 1977) (“Absolute measures of capital inadequacy, such as the 
amount of stockholder equity or other figures and ratios drawn from the cold pages of the corporation's 
balance sheets and financial statements, are of little utility, for the significance of this data depends in large 
part upon the nature of the business and other circumstances. Nor is the fact of eventual failure an 
appropriate test. This would be tantamount to ruling that an investor who takes an active role in corporate 
affairs must advance to his corporation all of the funds, which hindsight discloses it needed to survive.”) 
129 See J. Dennis Hynes “Lender Liability: The Dilemma of the Controlling Creditor”, 58 Tenn. L. Rev. 
635, 637-8 (1991). Hynes’ understanding of the lender liability problem is centered on agency costs, 
relying on the famous phrase of Justice Learned hand in Admiral Oriental Line v. United States expressing 
that “The doctrine stands upon the fact that the venture is the principal's, and that, as the profits will be his, 
so should be the expenses.” See Admiral Oriental Line v. United States, 86 F.2d 201, 202 (Second Circuit, 
1936). 
130 For a definition of the business judgment rule, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “A Positive Psychological 
Theory of Judging in Hindsight”, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 619 (1998), citing American Law Institute, 
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gross negligence, then imposing strict liability on a controlling lender would be strikingly 
inconsistent. 
 
Cognitive errors are mental shortcuts which “can create cognitive illusions that 
produce erroneous judgments.”131 Among those errors, hindsight bias occurs when 
“[p]eople overstate their own ability to have predicted the past and believe that others 
should have been able to predict events better than was possible.”132 Psichologists 
explain the hindsight bias as resulting “primarily from the natural (and useful) tendency 
for the brain to incorporate known outcomes into existing knowledge automatically, and 
to make further inferences from that knowledge.”133 Kamin and Rachlinski report the 
persistency of the effect despite numerous debiasing attempts. 134  It easily follows that 
the hindsight bias defies the prowess of decisionmakers (blurring the distinction between 
opportunism and an unfortunate turn of events) while it also questions the benefit of 
broadening the scope of lender control liability due to the important possibility that non-
negligent controlling lenders would be found liable. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations §4.01(c) at 177-78 (ALI 1991) (“an 
officer or director who is informed about a transaction being undertaken by the corporation, and is not an 
interested party in the transaction, “fulfills his duty [of care to the shareholders] if…he rationally believes 
that his business judgment is in the best interests of the corporation.”) 
131 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “ Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777, 780 (2001) 
132 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “ Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777,  799 (2001) (“the hindsight bias consists of using known outcomes to assess the predictability at 
some earlier time of something that has already happened”). See, also, Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Donald C. Langevoort “Fraud by Hindsight”, 98 Nw. U.L. Rev. 773, 774 (2004) (“People consistently 
overstate what could have been predicted after events have unfolded… Consequently, they blame others for 
failing to have foreseen events that reasonable people in foresight could not have foreseen”) 
133 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?”, 79 Or. L. 
Rev. 61, 68 (2000). 
134 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight”, 19 
Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 92 (1995) (“Unfortunately, the hindsight bias has proven resistant to most 
debiasing techniques… Some researchers have obtained limited debiasing by significantly restructuring the 
decision-making task, or by having participants consider alternative outcomes. Although these cognitive 
strategies have reduced the influence of the bias, no known technique completely eliminates the effect”). 
Somewhat surprisingly, one study found no evidence of hindsight bias on judges determinations of 
probable cause. See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding”, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1313-18 
(2005). 
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Empirical studies have demonstrated that judges, including in particular 
bankruptcy judges, are also affected by cognitive biases.135 In addition, several opinions 
recognize that adjudicators maybe under the influence of hindsight bias and therefore try 
to avoid taking actions that would make them prone to cognitive errors.136 For example, 
in Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v First Bank of Whiting Judge Easterbrook mentioned 
that “Debtor submits that conduct may be "unfair" and "inequitable" for [the] purpose [of 
determining whether to apply equitable subordination] even though the creditor complies 
with all contractual requirements, but we are not willing to embrace a rule that requires 
participants in commercial transactions not only to keep their contracts but also do 
"more" -just how much more resting in the discretion of a bankruptcy judge assessing the 
situation years later.”137 In Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 
the Delaware Chancery Court expressed “What Delaware law does not do is to impose 
retroactive fiduciary obligations on directors simply because their chosen business 
strategy did not pan out.”138  
 
Another well-known cognitive error is referred to as anchoring. Tversky and 
Kahneman define anchoring as the bias which occurs when people make estimates 
depending on an irrelevant starting point.139 Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich consider 
that “[a]nchors affect judgment by changing the standard of reference that people use 
when making numeric judgments.”140 Anchoring derives from the difficult problem of 
disregarding known information.141 Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski provide three 
theories to help explain this phenomenom: motivation, ironic process theory and mental 
                                                 
135 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “ Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s 
Mind”, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227 (2006). 
136 Gulati, Rachlinski and Langevoort state that “Courts cite concerns with hindsight in nearly one-third of 
all published opinions in securities class action cases.” See Mitu Gulati, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Donald C. 
Langevoort “Fraud by Hindsight”, 98 Nw. U.L. Rev. 773, 775 (2004). 
137 See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th circuit, 1990) 
(emphasis added) 
138 See Trenwick America Litigation Trust v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 173 (Del. Ch., 2006) 
139 See “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University Press, New York, 
NY (1982), p. 14. 
140 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777, 788 (2001) 
141 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible 
Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding”, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1260-70 (2005) 
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contamination. Motivation implies that people told to disregard information may increase 
their desire to attend to it, a concept researchers refer to as “psychological reactance”. 
Ironic process theory poses that even if individuals want to ignore information, they may 
find it difficult to avoid thinking about information they want to ignore. Mental 
contamination appears because the brain does not compartmentalize gathered 
information. Then, this information may affect their judgment by influencing how 
subsequent events are processed and which beliefs are formed. The strength of the 
anchoring effect has been shown to be negatively correlated to the confidence the 
evaluator has in its own assessment (i.e. “when people are not confident in their 
judgments, they are more susceptible to anchoring effects”), a confidence which 
Sunstein, Kahneman and Schkade believe to be low when awarding dollar amounts.142  
 
Anchoring has been empirically observed in many diverse fields.143 Specifically 
relating to the focus of this paper, Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich have produced three 
separate studies on anchoring effects in federal magistrates, state and federal judges and 
bankruptcy judges.144 The first study was conducted over a sample of federal magistrate 
judges who were asked to assess damages arising out an accident. They found that their 
sample group is also subject to anchoring,145 despite the fact that “judges are 
                                                 
142 See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade “Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes 
on Cognition and Valuation in Law)”, 107 Yale L. J. 2071, 2109 (1998).   
143 Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec asked MBA students whether they would buy some products for a price 
equal to the dollar figure equivalent to the last two digits of their social security number. Afterwards, they 
were asked to specify the highest amount they would be willing to pay for the products while reminded that 
the social security number is random. The subjects with higher social security numbers were willing to pay 
more for the products. See Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein “Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, 
Future”, in Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein & Matthew Rabin eds., Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ (2004), p. 13., citing Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec “Coherent 
Arbitrariness: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences”, 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 73 
(2003). For another example regarding underwriters recommendations, see Roni Michaely & Kent L. 
Womack “Market Efficiency and Biases in Brokerage Recommendations”, in Advances in Behavioral 
Finance, Richard H. Thaler ed., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ (2005), p. 408. 
144 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777, 780 (2001); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding”, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251 (2005); 
and, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind”, 86 
B.U.L. Rev. 1227 (2006). 
145 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777, 787-94 (2001). 
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experienced, well-trained, and highly motivated decision makers”.146 The second study, a 
similar damage assessment case, was conducted over a sample of federal magistrates, 
state and federal judges and tested anchoring effects with both low and high anchors. 
They found that both anchors had a significant impact on the amount of damages 
awarded. In the third study, bankruptcy judges faced a determination of interest rate in a 
chapter 13 case. Although, the results were smaller, anchoring still had an impact on the 
outcome.147 To the best of my knowledge, there has not been any study yet connecting 
anchoring to control related liability theories. 
 
B. Damage Assessments: the Role of Anchoring 
Despite the criticism voiced against strict liability when applied to controlling 
lenders, it has been advanced as a way to reduce the problems presented by hindsight bias 
in cases where “the technology of precaution is unilateral (in the sense that only the 
potential injurer can realistically take action to reduce the probability or severity of an 
accident)”.148 Lender control liability appears to fit the bill, as usually only the 
controlling lender is responsible for decisions affecting the outcome (i.e. whether to 
liquidate or reorganize).  
 
Theoretically, strict liability insulates injurers from the possibility of hindsight 
bias because the party who may potentially damage another assesses the situation ex ante, 
as he is always found liable, and doesn’t have to pay attention to ex post determinations 
of probabilities. To see why, it is convenient to look at the standard unilateral tort model 
                                                 
146 See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Judicial Mind”, 86 Cornell L. 
Rev. 777, 782 (2001) 
147 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ,Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind”, 
86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227, 1233-37 (2006) (“In the first of these studies, we showed that the introduction of an 
extremely low anchor reduced damage awards by 0.41 standard deviations. In the second study, we tested 
the effects of both a low and a high anchor and found that the low anchor reduced awards by 0.58 standard 
deviations, while the high anchor increased awards by 0.75 standard deviations. In the present study of 
bankruptcy judges, the anchor increased the interest rate by 0.37 standard deviations. The effect size 
observed in this study is only slightly smaller than the effect size we have observed in our previous studies 
of generalist judges. Therefore, we cannot conclude from this that bankruptcy judges are less susceptible 
than generalist judges to the anchoring effect”) 
148 In fact, Korobkin and Ulen propose to increase the use of strict liability as a way to limit the effect of 
hindsight bias. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen “Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics”,88 Calif. L. Rev. 1051, 1098-9 (2000)  
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of law and economics.149 In the model, there are two variables: injurers’ activity level z 
(chosen by injurers) and the level of care x which they can engage in. The activity level 
will generate benefit b(z) and the level of care generates a probability of harm p(x). In 
addition, it is assumed that x represents the private cost of an injurer deriving from 
prevention and that h, a fixed value, represents the possible damage caused by the injurer 
each time an injurer engages in his activity.  Then, the social object would be to 
maximize  
b(z) – z(x + p(x)h)    (1) 
which is advanced as the main rationale legal system should have. A potential injurer 
then prefers to be judged by strict liability when there’s a possibility of hindsight bias, as 
he erases the possibility that adjudicators determine that x generates a larger probability 
of accident than it actually did. The potential injurer will know ex ante the values of x, 
p(x) and h and therefore will maximize (1) without the need to pay attention to anything 
else. Hence, efficient activity and care levels are taken irrespective of hindsight bias.150
 
It doesn’t necessarily follow that strict liability should be applied to liability 
assessments against controlling parties (as lenders) as a way to prevent hindsight bias. 
Speaking of the functionally related BJR, Rachlinski considers that while it works as a 
“no liability” rule it is as an efficient way to achieve a second best in dealing with 
hindsight bias.151 Rachlinski provides both “equitable and economic” reasons to use a no 
                                                 
149 See Steven Shavell “Strict Liability Versus Negligence”, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980) 
150 Nonetheless, Rachlinski argues that even if negligence is the standard used to assess liability social 
efficiency may not be substantially affected, as lenders will understand the negligence standard as a quasi-
strict liability one. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight”, 65 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 571, 595-600 (1998) (“the hindsight bias converts the negligence standard into a de facto 
system of strict liability. Negligence judgments influenced by the hindsight bias should therefore have 
economic consequences similar to those of a system of strict liability.”) 
151 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight”, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
571, 619 (1998) (“have fewer adverse consequences than a rule of negligence judged in hindsight”). Jolls 
and Susntein believe that this type of debiasing rules are of an invasive character, as entirely block choice 
in the hope that legal outcomes will not fall prey to problems of bounded rationality and recommend the 
adoption of a less intrusive method. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein “Debiasing through Law”, 35 J. 
Legal Stud. 199, 202 (2006) (“Compared with the more common approach of insulating legal outcomes 
from the effects of bounded rationality, a significant advantage of strategies for debiasing through law is 
that they aim to correct errors while still preserving as much opportunity as possible for people to make 
their own choices… An important corollary of choice-preserving strategies is that they help to address 
boundedly rational behavior while avoiding the imposition of significant costs on those who do not exhibit 
bounded rationality.”) 
 34
liability rule in the case of the BJR. The later arguments refer to the disincentive that a 
strict liability would pose on people to become firm’s managers and the incentives to take 
excessive precautions, in turn undermining general economic activity.152 The former 
arguments focus on shareholders ability to fire managers directly or indirectly by selling 
their stock, the limited amount of loss suffered by shareholders and their ability to 
diversify their risk of loss.  
 
Regardless of whether the Rachlinski’s BJR analysis can be extended to lender 
control liability,153 the inability to trust adjudicators on liability assessments is due to a 
separate cause. Where lender control liability theories are involved, the superior 
characteristic of strict liability in unilateral torts doesn’t apply due to the difference in the 
formation of damage assessments. As it can be readily seen from the unilateral tort model 
description, the level of damages is entirely independent from the level of care exercised 
by the potential injurer, which in turn determines the probability of harm. This is not the 
case for lender control liability theories. An example will help to show the difference.  
 
Let’s assume that a controlling lender has 2 options154: he can either liquidate the 
firm (obtaining a fixed amount L) or reorganize it. If he chooses the reorganization 
option, he will incur for sure in reorganization costs C (i.e. negotiation costs, costs of 
running the firm until a plan is approved, etc) and may obtain a favorable reorganization 
value R+ with a probability p(R+) or an unfavorable reorganization value R- with 
                                                 
152 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight”, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
571, 622-3 (1998) 
153 The “equitable” reasons provided by Rachlinski do not seem compelling for lender control liability on 
firms formed partially with implicit contracts. First, as stock is not the only way to participate in the 
“ownership” of the firm, then voting control has a limited disciplining power. In addition, because the firm 
is in distress selling the stock (or claims) to sanction a controlling lender would have a very limited effect 
(if any at all). Second, if there are firm specific investments, the magnitude of the loss could be higher (i.e. 
in lost wages) than what was invested, frustrating for these actors the limited liability of corporations. 
Third, firm specific investments are not easily diversifiable (i.e. you can’t make large numbers of firm 
specific investments). The “economic” reasons may not deter a controlling lender. It is not clear what 
comprises excessive precautions. As lender control liability can potentially generate costs which are 
externalized to other constituents, it is not clear that today the optimal level of precautions is taken. I leave 
the resolution of these issues for future research. 
154 In this example, I am assuming that there are no problems emerging from different classes of legal 
claimholders and that relationship specific investments are not affected by the decision. Although I 
recognize the unrealistic nature of these assumptions, using them will help us to focus on why strict 
liability cannot help to insulate against the hindsight bias.  
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probability p(R-). Therefore, a controlling lender decides on a course of action depending 
on whether L is bigger or smaller than  
Cpp −∗+∗ −−++ )R(R)R(R   (2) 
 
Let’s assume, further, that the controlling lender chooses option L, the state of the 
world that realizes is the favorable one (R+) and then he is sued under lender control 
liability. If the adjudicator is to rule in favor of the plaintiff he will need to assess the 
amount of damages (which by assumption are traceable to the controlling lender’s 
decision). To accomplish the damage evaluation, the adjudicator needs to compare L to 
its assessment of the ex ante result of reorganization, given by (2). Provided that the later 
is bigger than the former, the controlling lender would have to pay damages equal to that 
difference.155 As L is fixed (whatever is obtained in the liquidation of the firm’s assets), 
then the damage assessment will depend on the estimated value of the reorganization. 
 
To obtain such a value, three values need to be estimated: the probabilities of each 
state of the world occurring, the costs of restructuring and the value of reorganizations. It 
is safe to assume that courts can estimate rather accurately restructuring costs due to their 
extended experience in the subject. As we have seen before, probabilities would likely be 
overestimated due to hindsight bias. Again, strict liability would prevent a controlling 
lender from suffering ex ante excessive damages if this was the setting. But the estimate 
of the reorganization value in different states of the world change the picture. In the 
simple model presented above, R+ is given; R- needs to be assessed. Therefore, only if R- 
is assessed incorrectly, then strict liability may not limit the effects of cognitive biases. R- 
value may be overestimated not due to hindsight, as it is not a probability, but most likely 
due to anchoring (produced by R+).156  
 
                                                 
155 We are abstracting here from any damages occurring out reliance in the behavior or words of the 
controlling lender. 
156 Another possibility of bias may be due to representativeness heuristics (i.e. a great description of the 
firm). See “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge University Press, 
New York, NY (1982), p. 8. 
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To sum up, a controlling lender may accurately estimate probabilities ex ante and 
therefore avoid problems related to hindsight bias if strict liability is used. Nonetheless, 
as other values need to be estimated (i.e. the value of the reorganized firm under other 
states of the world) and these estimates are outside of his control (actually decide upon by 
the adjudicator), strict liability may be an insufficient attempt to achieve an efficient 
outcome. The efficiency of the outcome of a lender control liability case then depends not 
just on hindsight bias but also on anchoring, their magnitude of the distortions and maybe 
the effects of these two heuristics on each other, if any.157  
 
Recognizing the existence of the combined effects of hindsight bias and 
anchoring is very important for practical adjudicating and legal policy debiasing 
efforts.158 Strategies geared to debias lender control liability adjudications need to pay 
attention to both hindsight and anchoring.159 Although both cognitive errors have proven 
to be very resistant to attempts to limit them, some partial results were obtained using 
different techniques for debiasing anchoring and hindsight bias. For example, applying a 
“consider the opposite strategy” has been shown to reduce the anchoring effect160 and a 
smaller anchoring effect was found when decision makers were specialized (bankruptcy 
judges and insurers).161 In addition, suggested solutions to hindsight bias, as strict 
liability or eliminating the adjudicator’s contact with some evidence162 may not work in 
the same way for anchoring.    
                                                 
157 In relation to their experiment Kamin and Rachlinski discuss hindsight bias interaction with anchoring. 
See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight”, 19 
Law & Hum. Behav. 89, 101 (1995) 
158 On the different debiasing techniques, see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein “Debiasing through Law”, 
35 J. Legal Stud. 199 (2006).  
159 The point here is not about the different source these two effects, but about the different consequences 
for legal policy. In fact, some authors believe that anchoring and the hindsight bias have the same cognitive 
source. See Rüdiger Pohl, Markus Eisenhauer & Oliver Hardt “Sara: A Cognitive Process Model to 
Simulate the Anchoring Effect and Hindsight Bias”, 11 Memory 337, 338 (2003) 
160 See Thomas Mussweiler, Fritz Strack & Tim Pfeiffer “Overcoming the Inevitable Anchoring Effect: 
Considering the Opposite Compensates for Selective Accessibility”, 26 Pers Soc Psychol Bull 1142, 1146 
(2000) 
161 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski ,Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich “Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind”, 
86 B.U.L. Rev. 1227, 1237 (2006); Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Insurers, Illusions of Judgment 
& Litigation”, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 2017, 2022 (2006) 
162 Wistrich, Guthrie and Rachlinski recommend to separate “managerial judging” from adjudication. See 
Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? 
The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding”, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1259 (2005) (“a judge who 
supervises settlement discussions should not serve as the fact finder in the same case”) 
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 VI. Conclusion 
 The central goal of this paper has been to functionally analyze the ubiquitous 
problem of lender control by, first, tying it to modern economic understandings of what a 
firm is, then, reestablishing a proper role for lender control liability theories, and, finally, 
examining how cognitive errors may affect the adjudication of lender control liability 
cases. Lender control liability theories have largely fallen in disuse by United States 
courts. The implicit understanding of the theory of the firm by legal academics and courts 
has made it possible. Broadening the scope of the theory of the firm permits a better 
understanding that there is a role for lender liability theories besides mimicking the so 
called absolute priority rule.  
 
In addition, the paper serves to uncover that lender control liability theories are 
not sufficient to correct all the inefficiencies arising out of allocating control to a lender. 
Because allocation of control is not innocuous in chapter 11 reorganizations, some of the 
effects it posses on ex ante relationship specific investors cannot be corrected by merely 
penalizing a controlling lender without at the same time penalizing lender’s gain of 
control. It is yet to be proven that a lender’s gain of control is inefficient. On the contrary, 
the finance literature considers that lenders obtaining control contingent on some 
imperfect signal is the more efficient state of affairs. 
 
Finally, the paper has exposed that even though lender control may not be 
optimal, cognitive errors may produce systematic distortions that challenge the 
application of lender liability theories. Specifically, the paper uncovered that hindsight 
bias is not the only heuristic which must be taken into account when thinking about 
lender control liability application. Anchoring plays a substantive role which limits the 
desirability of applying strict liability as a debiasing technique.  
 
There are several avenues for future research, three of which I outline here. First, 
as the theory of the firm shows that there may be value not captured by legal claims, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether bankruptcy definition of claims should be 
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enlarged to incorporate some of these economic factors today not accounted by 
bankruptcy laws. Second, the relation between different heuristics used in control liability 
adjudications seems to be a fruitful field for future research. Questions regarding the 
potential influence of anchoring on hindsight bias or hindsight bias on anchoring or both 
need to be answered to provide better policy recommendations. In addition, an 
assessment of the overall effect of heuristics, given the individual variation on cognitive 
errors, would be especially helpful.163 Finally, it would be interesting to explore the 
exactitude of the common assumption in the literature stating that control shifts to the 
lender after covenant violations.164 Such a study would help in assessing the magnitude 
of the societal costs generated by refusing to accept the possibility of lender control costs.  
                                                 
163 For discussions on individual variation, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski “Cognitive errors, Individual 
Differences and Paternalism”, 73 U.Chi. L. Rev. 207 (2006); and, Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein 
“Debiasing through Law”, 35 J. Legal Stud. 199 (2006)  
164 See Stuart C. Gilson “Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders”, 27 Journal of Financial 
Economics 355, 356 (1990) (“…models of bankruptcy often assume that creditors take control of the 
bankrupt firm’s assets”); Phillippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton “An Incomplete Contracts Approach to 
Financial Contracting”, 59 Review of Economic Studies 473 (1992). 
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